Abstract-This paper investigates cooperation for secrecy in cognitive radio networks. In particular, we consider a four-node cognitive scenario where the secondary receiver is treated as a potential eavesdropper with respect to the primary transmission. The cognitive transmitter can help the primary transmission, and it should also ensure that the primary message is not leaked to the secondary user. We consider two cognitive scenarios depending on whether the secondary transmitter knows the primary message or not. In the first case, the secondary transmitter is unaware of the primary transmitter's message and acts as a helping interferer to enhance the secrecy of the primary transmission, whereas in the second case, relaying of the primary message is also within its capabilities. First, we find achievable rate regions for these two scenarios in the case of AWGN channels. We then investigate three different optimization problems: the maximization of the primary rate, the maximization of the secondary rate and the minimization of the secondary transmit power. For these optimization problems, we find closed-form expressions in important special cases. Furthermore, we analyze the cooperation between the primary and secondary transmitters from a game-theoretic perspective. We model their interaction as a Stackelberg game, for which we define and find the Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, we use numerical examples to illustrate the rate regions, the three optimizations, and the impact of the Stackelberg game on the achievable rates and on the transmission strategies of the secondary transmitter.
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I. INTRODUCTION
C OGNITIVE radio technology, introduced by Mitola in [1] , proposes an efficient way to sense the spectrum, decode information from detected signals and use this knowledge to improve the overall performance of communication systems. In cognitive radio networks, secondary users are allowed to use the licensed spectrum as long as they do not degrade the data transmission of the primary users, which are the legacy owners of the spectrum. In the setting where both the primary and secondary networks consist of a single transmitter-receiver pair, the cognitive radio scenario is captured by the interference channel with some additional assumptions and constraints; and hence it can be analyzed from an information-theoretic perspective [2] . In recent years, security issues in cognitive radio networks have been the subject of growing interest, e.g., [3] , [4] . Security threats can, for instance, arise in the presence of passive eavesdropping node(s) trying to intercept the communication between authenticated nodes. A promising approach towards achieving secure communications has been developed by Wyner in [5] : information theoretic secrecy. The idea of information theoretic secrecy lies in exploiting the randomness of the communication channels to ensure the secrecy of the transmitted messages. As a performance measure for communication systems with secrecy constraints, the secrecy rate is defined as a rate at which the message can be transmitted reliably and securely between the legitimate nodes. Similarly to communication networks without secrecy constraints, the overall system performance is generally limited by the channel conditions. In particular, the legitimate parties need to have some advantage over the eavesdropper in terms of channel quality to guarantee secure communication. Therefore, many techniques have been proposed to enhance secrecy at the physical layer, such as the use of multiple-input multipleoutput (MIMO) transmission, e.g., in [6] , [7] .
Recently, there has been a substantial interest in the secrecy of multi-user systems [8] , with a particular emphasis on potential cooperation between users to enhance the secrecy of communications. If the cooperating nodes are also potential eavesdroppers, the interaction between cooperation and secrecy appears to be complex [9] , [10] , and it is unclear whether cooperation can, in fact, improve secrecy, or whether there is a trade-off between cooperation and secrecy. Assuming that the cooperating node(s) can be trusted and aiming at increasing the secrecy of the transmission in the presence of a possible external eavesdropper, several cooperative strategies have been proposed and they can be classified into two types. For the strategies of the first type, the cooperating parties improve the secrecy performance of the system by weakening the eavesdropping link. Hence, in contrast to wireless communications without secrecy, where interference is considered as an undesired effect, interference can potentially be a beneficial phenomenon for secure communications. Many works have considered the impact of different variants of interference injection, under the names of noise-forwarding [11] , cooperative jamming [12] , or interference assisted secret communication [13] . The second type corresponds to the classical sense of cooperation, where the cooperating nodes strengthen the main 0733-8716/14/$31.00 c 2014 IEEE transmission by using common relaying techniques such as decode-and-forward or amplify-and-forward [14] . The concept of cooperation for secrecy, and the corresponding cooperative techniques can naturally be applied to cognitive radio networks. In [15] , a scenario where an external eavesdropper attempts to decode the primary user's message is considered. In exchange of cooperation from the secondary user to improve its own secrecy rate, the primary user allows the secondary user a share of the spectrum. A different setup is investigated in [4] : the secondary user wants to keep its message confidential to the primary network; that is, the primary receiver is viewed as an eavesdropper from the secondary network perspective. In [16] , the case where both receivers are eavesdroppers to the other user's message is investigated, and inner and outer bounds on the capacityequivocation region are derived.
In the present paper, partially based on our previous work in [17] and [18] , we explore the novel case where the secondary receiver U 2 is treated as a potential eavesdropper with respect to the primary transmission. Since the primary users are the legacy owners of the spectrum, the confidentiality of the primary message should be considered. In this context, the primary transmitter T 1 may be assisted by the trustworthy secondary transmitter T 2 if the cooperation could improve the secrecy performance, while the secondary transmitter benefits as it is awarded a share of the spectrum for its data transmission. This model is particularly relevant since it describes, for example, a scenario where the primary user U 1 subscribes for a premium content while the secondary user only subscribes for free content. Both transmitters belong to the same entity, thus the cognitive transmitter can help the primary transmission, but it should ensure that no premium content is leaked to the secondary user. Furthermore, this model has the advantage of providing a justification for the common assumption of the knowledge of the eavesdropper's channels, since the eavesdropper is actually a legitimate user in the network.
We consider two types of cooperation potentially realized by the cognitive transmitter: oblivious cooperation and cooperation with knowledge of primary transmitter's message. In the first case, the secondary transmitter is unaware of the primary transmitter's message and acts as a deaf helper to enhance the secrecy of the primary transmission, whereas in the second case, relaying of the primary message is also within its capabilities. For both cases, we derive achievable rate regions. We illustrate those regions through numerical examples, where we show how the knowledge of the secret message at the secondary transmitter significantly increases the achievable rate region.
Secondly, we consider different optimization scenarios for the strategy of the secondary transmitter. On the one hand, T 2 could either aim at maximizing its own achievable rate, under the constraint that the resulting rate achievable by the primary network is not lower than the wiretap rate achievable without cooperation (problem P R2 ), or T 2 could as well aim at maximizing the primary system achievable rate under a constraint on its own rate (problem P R1 ). On the other hand, the goal of T 2 could also be to minimize its transmit power, under the constraints that the rates of both users are above a certain threshold (problem P P2 ). The corresponding optimization problems are investigated in this work. We derive closed-form expressions for the optimal power splitting of T 2 for some particular scenarios and illustrate these optimization problems numerically.
Finally, we analyze the cooperation between the primary and secondary transmitters in a game-theoretic perspective. Game theory can be defined as: "a formal framework with a set of mathematical tools to study the complex interactions among interdependent rational players" [19] . Recently, there has been a growing interest to game-theoretic approaches for modeling and analyzing communication systems. In particular, since primary and secondary users have their own interests and thus do not cooperate unconditionally, non-cooperative game theory tools are a common approach to model their interaction in cognitive radio networks with secrecy constraints (e.g., in [20] and [15] ) or without secrecy constraints ( [21] , [22] ). An appropriate model for such scenarios is the Stackelberg game model [23] with T 1 being the game leader selling some fraction of its spectrum and T 2 being the follower awarded a share of the spectrum for its cooperation, as in [24] . Therefore, we model the interaction between T 1 and T 2 as a Stackelberg game, and we define the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium, which we derive in a closed-form expression for some important cases. We furthermore illustrate the impact of this game on the achievable rates and on the transmission strategies of T 2 which we compare to the optimal rates, transmit power, and the strategies obtained from P R2 , P R1 and P P2 . The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• We provide an achievable rate region with secrecy constraints for the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel model with message knowledge at the secondary transmitter. Our results, more specifically, give an insight on the achievable rates of the corresponding power allocation scheme for each of the given cognitive scenarios.
• Considering possible systematic aims, we formulate and solve three relevant power allocation problems for the given set-up (i.e., based on P R2 , P R1 and P P2 ). The optimal strategy of the secondary transmitter for each problem is accordingly demonstrated based on the analytical solution.
• We further analyze, using the Stackelberg game model, a realistic power allocation scenario corresponding to an optimization of both transmitters' utilities. A comparison to the results obtained from P R2 and P P2 is given, showing the interactions between the two users.
• Finally, we illustrate our results through numerical examples based on a geometrical setup, highlighting the impact of the node geometry on the achievable rates and on the optimal strategy of the secondary transmitter. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we define our system model, the notation, and the two different cognitive scenarios. Section III provides us with an achievable rate region for the given set-up under the AWGN channel model. In Section IV, we discuss possible optimization problems for the given scenario and their game-theoretic counterparts and compare those through numerical simulations in Section'V. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. Network Model and Cognitive Scenarios
In this paper, we investigate the cognitive radio network described in Fig. 1 . The cognitive radio network consists of the following single antenna nodes: a primary transmitter T 1 , a cognitive secondary transmitter T 2 , a primary receiver U 1 and a secondary receiver U 2 . T 1 wishes to transmit the secret message w 1 , which is intended to U 1 , and which should be kept secret from U 2 , whereas T 2 wants to transmit the message w 2 (without secrecy constraints) to the secondary receiver U 2 . In this set-up, we consider two different cooperative scenarios, as represented in Fig. 1 . In the first scenario S 1 , T 2 has no knowledge of the secret message w 1 . In the second scenario S 2 , T 2 knows the secret message w 1 perfectly.
B. Channel Model and Notations
We consider the following AWGN channel model
where the noises n 1 , n 2 are real-valued Gaussian distributed with unit variance, i.e., n 1 , n 2 ∼ N (0, 1). All channel coefficients are assumed to remain constant during the transmission of a codeword. Moreover, we consider the path-loss channel model so that c i,
, where d i,j is the distance between transmitter i and receiver j and α is the path-loss exponent.
The transmitters use the channel by encoding their messages into codewords of length n. T 1 encodes message w 1 into the codeword x 1 = (x 1,1 , . . . , x 1,n ). T 2 assigns a codeword x 2 = (x 2,1 , . . . , x 2,n ) to the message w 2 or, possibly, to the set of messages (w 1 , w 2 ) in the scenarios S 1 and S 2 , respectively. The codewords have to satisfy average power constraints P 1 and P 2 respectively, i.e.,
The receivers decode their receptions y 1 and y 2 into message estimatesŵ 1 andŵ 2 , respectively.
C. Information Theoretic Secrecy
A rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) for the messages w 1 and w 2 is said to be achievable, if the average error probabilities P e,1 Pr{ŵ 1 = w 1 } and P e,2
Pr{ŵ 2 = w 2 } can be made arbitrarily small, while the message w 1 stays secure from the secondary receiver. In other terms, for any ε > 0 and a sufficiently large n, the following conditions hold:
When T 2 does not transmit, the maximum achievable rate R WT 1 such that both the reliability and secrecy conditions are fulfilled is known as the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel [5] and is given by:
where C(x) 1 2 log(1 + x) and a + max(0, a). We observe that the secrecy capacity is only positive if the primary link has better quality than the link between T 1 and U 2 . Therefore, secrecy concerns lay the foundation of mutual cooperation between primary and secondary transmitters since cooperation from T 2 could allow strictly positive secrecy rates, while allowing the secondary network to transmit its own message.
III. ACHIEVABLE RATE REGIONS
In this section, we introduce some results on the achievable rate regions for the cognitive interference channel with secrecy constraint on the primary message. In Section III-A, we consider the scenario S 1 , while in Section'III-B, the scenario S 2 is investigated.
A. Cooperation without Message Knowledge at Secondary Transmitter
We first consider the cognitive scenario S 1 , i.e., the second transmitter does not know the secret message w 1 . This scenario was previously considered in [20] . Here, we present the achievable rate region obtained in that work and describe the corresponding achievable scheme.
Encoding Scheme: The secondary transmitter
, and q is the time-sharing parameter. Note that in the following, we restrict ourselves to a deterministic timesharing variable. In other words, T 2 splits its available power P 2 into three parts: P 2s for its own message w 2 , P 2c for the common message which should be decoded by both receivers and P 2j for a jamming signal, such that P 2 = P 2s + P 2c + P 2j and R 2 = R 2s +R 2c . The corresponding achievable rate region is given in the following proposition [20] . Proposition 1. The achievable rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is given by the following region R 1 :
(5b)
for every possible power splitting P 2 = P 2s + P 2c + P 2j , and with
The achievable rate region can be interpreted as follows. First, T 2 uses the rate splitting technique introduced by Han and Kobayashi in [25] . Rate splitting allows a significant rate improvement in the "strong interference" regime. Furthermore, T 2 uses a power P 2j for a Gaussian jamming signal. We notice that, while this jamming signal can only decrease the secondary rate R 2 since it is not decodable by U 2 , it can possibly increase the achievable rate of the primary user since the interference injection increases the confusion of U 2 about the primary message w 1 . This effect is reflected by the influence of P 2j in Equation (5a). The positive term in (5a) can be interpreted as the achievable primary rate without secrecy constraints while the negative term represents the amount of rate T 1 has to sacrifice to guarantee a secure transmission.
In order to represent the rate region efficiently, we also reformulate R 1 using the Fourier-Motzkin elimination [26] :
B. Cooperation with Message Knowledge at Secondary Transmitter
In this section, we assume that the secondary transmitter T 2 knows the primary message w 1 perfectly. The assumption is justified whenever primary and secondary transmitter are connected by a link with sufficiently high secrecy capacity. Such a connection can for instance be realized by a wired link, which has a capacity of at least R 1 . As in the previous scenario, T 1 encodes into the codeword x 1 , independently of the encoding at T 2 . Now with the knowledge of w 1 , T 2 is able to encode (w 1 , w 2 ) into x 2 based on four strategies as follows:
1) Transmission of a common message: As in S 1 , the common message, encoded by V 2c binned against x 1 has to be decoded by both users U 1 and U 2 . 2) Transmission of the secondary message: As in S 1 , w 2 encoded into V 2s to be decoded by the secondary user U 2 only. 3) Jamming: S 1 , the jamming signal is encoded into J 2 to confuse the eavesdropping secondary user U 2 . 4) Relaying (or broadcasting) of the primary message: w 1 is encoded into V 1p , binned against V 2s conditioned on V 2c , x 1 to be decoded only by the primary user U 1 . Therefore, this encoding scheme results in T 2 splitting its transmission power into P 2 = P 2s + P 2c + P 2j + P 2p , where the new term P 2p is the power allocated to V 1p encoding the primary message.
Proposition 2. The achievable rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ), with R 2 = R 2c + R 2s is given by the following region R 2 :
for every possible power splitting P 2 = P 2s + P 2c + P 2j + P 2p .
Proof: For the sake of brevity, we only give the idea of the proof. This scenario is a special case of the setup investigated in [16] where the secrecy of w 2 with respect to U 1 is also required. In that set-up, an achievable rate-equivocation region for the general case of a discrete memoryless interference channel is derived. Our scenario reduces to a subset of equations in this region, since we have no constraints on the secrecy of the secondary message. Furthermore, equations (6)- (9) in Theorem 1 in [16] follow from the achievable scheme in [27] while we consider here the more general scheme from [28] where the secondary user can also relay the primary message. Finally, we specialize the result in [16] to Gaussian channels, by defining the auxiliary random variables and joint distributions. The region R 2 follows from choosing the joint distributions as in [20] , except for x 2 as we allocate the power P 2p for broadcasting the message w 1 at T 2 , i.e.,
This choice of the auxiliary variables leading to R 2 is not optimal; however, it leads to a more tractable rate region for the optimization analysis in the following sections.
We also reformulate the region R 2 by using FourierMotzkin elimination:
Finally, for convenience in the remainder of this paper, we will parameterize the power fractions devoted to jamming, common message, relaying and own message as P 2j = ρP 2 , P 2c = β(1 − ρ)P 2 , P 2p = γ(1 − β)(1 − ρ)P 2 and P 2s = (1 − γ)(1 − β)(1 − ρ)P 2 , respectively. The parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of the total power P 2 used for jamming. The remaining power (1 − ρ)P 2 is divided by the parameter β ∈ [0, 1], where the fraction β(1 − ρ)P 2 is used for the strategy of transmitting a common message. Finally, the parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] divides the remaining power (1 − β)(1 − ρ)P 2 into power fractions for relaying the primary message w 1 and transmitting the secondary message w 2 .
Note that in Scenario S 1 , we have γ = 0, since T 2 does not know w 1 . In some parts of this paper we will consider the case β = 0, referred to as "no common message".
IV. SYSTEM OPTIMIZATION
In this section we derive closed-form solutions for a set of interesting optimization problems. Firstly, we define two new rate regions for the important case P 2c = 0, where T 2 is unable to use a common message. Note that the common message has to be decoded by the primary receiver along with the primary message w 1 . However, a legacy receiver might not have the necessary decoding capability to decode both messages. Instead, the receiver might use the legacy codebook to decode w 1 and treat the remaining signal components as noise. In this situation, T 2 has to refrain from using a common message. For the scenario S 1 without common message, our rate region, denoted as S 1,SD , simplifies to:
For the scenario S 2 without common message, we consider the rate region S 2,SD :
Note that the rate region S 2,SD reduces to the region S 1,SD with ρ = 0. Hence, studying the region S 2,SD covers both cases of cooperation with and without message knowledge.
A. Optimization with Full Cooperation
In this subsection we consider optimization under the assumption of full cooperation between primary and secondary systems. The two transmitters jointly find the optimum operation strategy for the given constraints. This is in contrast to a game-theoretic approach which we consider in the subsequent subsection IV-B. In the latter approach, the primary transmitter defines its mode of operation independently of the secondary system. Afterwards, the secondary transmitter chooses its own operation mode based on the choice of the primary transmitter.
We study three important optimizations: First, we maximize the secondary rate R 2 subject to the primary rate being no less than the wiretap rate R 1 ≥ R WT 1 . The motivation is that R WT 1 is the achievable rate if the secondary transmitter is not present, and the secondary user acts as an eavesdropper. Second, we minimize the secondary transmit power P 2 subject to the previous constraint R 1 ≥ R WT 1 and the constraint R 2 ≥ R thr 2 for some arbitrary threshold R thr 2 . At last, we maximize the primary rate R 1 subject to the constraint R 2 ≥ R thr 2 . Primary system tries to gain as much rate as it can when some certain secondary rate is ensured. 
1) Maximization of Secondary Rate P R2 :
We first investigate the optimization problem P R2 . In particular we consider the optimization P R2 (β) (no common message) defined as
and
The first constraint means that the secondary system must not degrade the performance of the primary system, whereas the second constraint reflects a limited transmit power of the secondary transmitter. The maximization P R2 (β) is depicted in Fig. 2 The figure shows the rates R 1 and R 2 as functions of ρ and γ. The surface that attains its maximum at ρ = 1 corresponds to R 1 ; the other surface with maximum at ρ = γ = 0 corresponds to R 2 . The constraint R is depicted by the red plane. The feasible set of parameters ρ and γ corresponds to the region where R 1 is above that plane. This region is projected down on R 2 and marked by white grid lines. Within this region we find the point that maximizes R 2 , depicted by the red dot.
Closed-form Expression for P R2 (β,γ): Since problem P R2 (β,γ) is non-convex, to simplify the analysis, we consider the special case of γ = 0, where T 2 does not relay the primary message. By the equality of the rate regions S 1,SD and S 2,SD for β = 0, this is also the case where T 2 does not possess the primary message, that is, the deaf helper case. The general case for arbitrary γ will be considered in Section V. The rate region S 1,SD for γ = 0 is given by equations (9a) and (9b). First, consider that R 1 increases with increasing ρ, whereas R 2 decreases with decreasing ρ due to (9a) and (9b). Hence, any change of parameters that increases R 1 is also decreasing R 2 . Therefore, the maximum R 2 will be attained for R 1 = R WT 1 . We solve
Plugging ρ into (9b) yields
for the maximum achievable secondary rate R 2 . Maximizing 2 2R2 is equivalent to maximizing R 2 , since R 2 ≥ 0. We realize that R 2 is not necessarily maximized by using all the available secondary power P 2 = P
In order for R WT 1
to be positive, we require c 12 < 1. This yields a R2 > 0 and b R2 > 0; hence, there exists at most one positive extremum
The second derivative
is negative, which means that P crit 2 is the maximum we were seeking for. In the degraded scenario in which P
To calculate the corresponding R 2 , we plug P 2 into (13); then we plug both values into (9b). We notice that the maximum R 2 is limited by the secrecy constraint which causes the limited feasible values of P 2 and the corresponding parameters. The simulation results of Fig. 5 in Section V further reflect our solution, especially in the column for P R2 (β), the secrecy constraint results in an unfeasible area in which the secondary transmitter can do nothing.
2) Minimization of Secondary Transmission Power P P2 : Similarly, we consider the minimization of secondary transmit power without common message P P2 (β) defined as
in which the primary rate R 1 is constrained by the wiretap rate R WT 1 , and the secondary rate R 2 should at least meet the required threshold R thr 2 . The motivation for this optimization is energy consumption control, which can be applied to green communications. Green communications technologies provide solutions to contribute to the reduction of carbon footprint, an objective that is realized by increasing the energy efficiency of communications networks in a wireless environment. For cognitive radio networks, the cognitive properties can further help make the communication more efficient and flexible [29] .
The minimization P P2 (β) of P 2 is depicted in Fig. 3 . The figure shows the rate region (R 1 , R 2 ) for different values of P 2 . Furthermore, the constraints R WT 1 and R thr 2 are depicted as pink and blue planes, respectively. The rate region must contain at least one point that fulfill both constraints in order for the corresponding value of P 2 to be feasible. The point that minimizes P 2 is depicted as a red dot.
Again, being in general non-convex, the problem can be simplified by reformulating the rate constraints into constraints on the secondary power. We solve both constraints (15b) and (15c) for P 2 . The first constraint (15b) yields:
with
where we used the expressions (4) and (10) for R WT 1 and R 1 , respectively. We also introduced the short-hand notationR 1 = 2 2R WT 1 . SinceR 1 > 1, we have x P2 < 0, hence, (16) yields
Similarly, withR 2 = 2 2R thr 2 , the secondary rate constraint (15c) in conjunction with (11) yields:
To solve for P 2 we transform the above equation to
We see that forR 2 (ρ + γ − ργ) < 1 we get the constraint
whereas forR 2 (ρ + γ − ργ) ≥ 1, there is no solution to (20) . Accordingly, the feasible set for the optimization of P 2 is defined by P (1) 2 ≥ P (2) 2 whenR 2 (ρ + γ − ργ) < 1. We see that P (2) 2 is increasing in both γ and ρ, so the optimum P 2 lies in the intersection P everywhere, i.e., no feasible ρ or γ, which cannot apply. We easily see that the first case cannot apply either: at ρ = γ = 0, T 2 uses all its power to transmit its own secondary message. Hence, for any P 2 > 0, we have R 1 < R WT that we cannot have R 2 > 0 at this point, which violates any reasonable constraint R 2 ≥ R thr 2 . With the two cases excluded, the smallest feasible value for P 2 has to lie in this intersection. Hence, the previous problem simplifies to
In the following, we consider the optimization for ρ = 0 and γ = 0 separately, i.e., T 2 either acts as a deaf helper or has access to w 1 and cooperates actively.
Closed-form Expression for P P2 (β,γ): For γ = 0, i.e., for the oblivious cooperation scenario, P
with a P2 R 2 c 22 (
, and c P2 c 21 P 1 . Note that a P2 , b P2 and c P2 are constants and a P2 > 0. Hence, the only positive solution for ρ is
The solution is feasible if ρ < 1/R 2 , otherwise there exists no solution.
Closed-form Expression for P P2 (β,ρ): For ρ = 0, i.e., with message knowledge, P
, and f P2 c 21 P 1 . (25) has two solutions
In order to be feasible, the solutions need to lie within the interval (0, 1/R 2 ). The optimum γ is the minimum of the feasible solutions, because P (2) 2 is increasing in γ. A visualization of our solution is given in Fig. 7 . Consider the first column, which depicts the scenario without common message (β = 0). Clearly there are two dominating strategies: If the secondary transmitter T 2 is located close to the primary receiver, it mainly relays the primary message. The strategy we analyzed above is used when T 2 is close to the secondary receiver. It is a combination of jamming and transmitting the secondary message w 2 .
3) Maximization of Primary Rate P R1 : In the last part, we discuss the maximization problem of primary rate P R1 . In this problem, we focus on protecting the priority of the primary system. We define the maximization problem P R1 (β) as
The constraints imply that by using a limited transmit power, T 2 needs to support as much the primary rate gain as possible while maintaining a certain transmission rate of its own.
Closed-form Expression for P R1 (β,γ):
We analyze the simplified deaf helper case P R1 (β,γ) here for γ = 0. From equation (9a) we see that R 1 increases with ρ. If we plug (9b) into the constraint (27b), we see that R 2 decreases with ρ. Hence, the maximum R 1 will be attained for R 2 = R thr 2 , which we solve for ρ as
in whichR 2 = 2 2R thr 2 . By plugging (28) into (9a), we get the following expression for the maximum rate R 1 ,
(29) The expression, and thus R 1 , is not necessarily maximized by using all secondary power P 2 = P thr 2 . So we solve
, and c R1 c 12 c 22R2 (1 + P 1 )+c 21 (1 + c 12 P 1 )(c 12 P 1 (R 2 − 1)− 1). The two solutions of the quadratic equation
are candidates for the rate maximizing power P 2 . We find the maximum R 1 by plugging the two values P Consider Fig. 6 for a visualization of the solution. Similar as for the previous optimization P P2 (β,γ), the optimization P R1 (β,γ) yields a solution when the secondary transmitter T 2 is close to the secondary receiver. Interestingly, it is not required to utilize all available secondary power P 2 to maximize R 1 . The reason is that R 1 could only be maximized by increasing the jamming. This, however, demands for a higher power P 2s for transmitting the secondary message w 2 to meet the requirement on R 2 . Both jamming and transmitting w 2 cause interference to the primary receiver. The interference is too high to justify the jamming.
B. Optimization with Game-Theoretic Cooperation
In this section, we analyze the cooperation between primary and secondary transmitters through a game-theoretic framework. Since T 1 and T 2 have their own interests and thus do not cooperate unconditionally, non-cooperative game theory is a natural approach to model their interaction. A Stackelberg game between T 1 and T 2 is a common model for the cognitive scenario. In a Stackelberg game model, there exists a hierarchy among the competing players. In this perspective, we consider T 1 as the game leader selling some fraction of its spectrum to T 2 and, subsequently, T 2 as the follower being awarded a share of the spectrum for its cooperation, similarly to [30] (CRN without secrecy constraints) and to [24] (with secrecy). In the proposed Stackelberg game, it is assumed that the primary transmitter operates at a fixed power P 1 and the secondary transmitter is allowed to use some power to transmit its own data. At the same time, the latter user has to help the primary system to reduce the possible leakage to the secondary receiver by employing some Gaussian jamming (or relaying of the primary message, if applicable).
The next step of the analysis is to solve the game, i.e., to predict the strategies that the rational players would adopt, and hence to determine the corresponding outcome. For the Stackelberg game model, the outcome of this competitive and decentralized behavior can be described by the solution concept called the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE). In this section, we define the Stackelberg equilibrium of the power-control game between T 1 and T 2 and we derive it in a closed-form expression for some important cases.
1) Oblivious cooperation:
If the primary message is not available at the secondary receiver, the corresponding rate region reduces to the one formed by (9a) and (9b). Throughout the two following subsections we consider a case where P 2c = 0, and hence no common message is available.
Definition of the Game: T 2 can be modeled as a buyer of the resource from the primary system which wants to maximize its achievable rate minus the cost of the power. The utility function of the source is then defined as
where θ represents the price per unit power for the secondary transmitter. T 2 intends to maximize its utility, i.e., to solve the following maximization problem:
T 1 can be seen as a seller aiming to earn a payment from T 2 for the power used. We define its utility function as
Similarly, T 1 wants to maximize its utility; i.e.,:
The SE of the game is then given by [23]
The corresponding equilibrium utilities are
). The Stackelberg interaction process can be explained as follows. T 1 , as a leader, sets some value to the parameter ρ, which T 2 , as a follower, takes into account. The secondary transmitter then optimizes P 2 to maximize its own utility U 2 (ρ, P 2 ). One can show that the second derivative of U 2 (ρ, P 2 ) is given by
Since ρ ∈ [0, 1], function U 2 (ρ, P 2 ) is concave in P 2 and therefore, the optimal power as a function of the jamming power fraction is found by setting the derivative ∂ ∂P2 U 2 (ρ, P 2 ) to zero. The optimal power allocation is then given by amax amin min{a min , max{a max , a}}. Further, T 2 can compute the optimal jamming fraction ρ maximizing its own utility function U 1 (ρ, P 2 ):
The optimal jamming fraction ρ is then plugged into (37) to obtain the optimal power level of the secondary transmitter P 2 (ρ ). Thus, a pair (P 2 (ρ ), ρ ) determines the Stackelberg equilibrium for the game, that is, the optimal power allocation for the secondary user.
2) Cooperation with primary message knowledge at the secondary transmitter: Defining the utility functions in the same way, we let the primary transmitter set parameters ρ and γ. For ease of exposition, we define two following quantities. Let λ ρ+(1−ρ)γ be the fraction of the power the secondary transmitter devotes to helping the primary system (viz., it includes both jamming and relaying) and let μ ρ λ be the fraction of this power devoted only to jamming.
The procedure of the Stackelberg game is similar to the previous case. The secondary transmitter, as a follower, takes λ into account, and computes its power P 2 (λ) according to precisely the same solution as given in (37). Meanwhile, the primary transmitter can compute the optimal pair (λ , μ ) maximizing its own utility function (33):
Finally, knowing the optimal λ and μ , the secondary transmitter can compute its final power allocation P 2 (λ , μ ).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS In this section we present the results of numerical simulations and some related discussion. We start by plotting the rate regions for a particular topology of interest revealing the importance of the different strategies of the secondary system, such as jamming, relaying and using a common message. We then reconsider the three optimization problems from the previous section -maximization of R 2 (P R2 ), maximization of R 1 (P R1 ), and minimization of P 2 (P P2 ) -as well as the Stackelberg game. We study the secondary rate attained, as well as the consumed secondary power. In particular, we are interested in how the system behaves for different locations of the secondary transmitter.
In our simulation, we fix the location of the primary transmitter and receiver at the coordinates (0, 1) and (1, 1) , respectively. The secondary receiver is fixed at (1, 0) . We assume a path-loss model with path-loss exponent α = 3, that is,
ij . The power constraints at both transmitters are P max 1 = P max 2 = 10. Each set of parameters (ρ, β, γ) yields a pentagon-shaped rate region. We vary the parameters over a sufficiently fine grid and take the convex hull over all corresponding rate regions. 
A. Performance Optimization
In Fig. 4 , we plot the rate regions for T 2 being at the position (0.5, 0). The black solid line corresponds to the region S 1 , where T 2 knows the primary message and can use all strategies jamming, relaying and common message transmission. The green dash-dotted line depicts the rate region S 2 achievable by the oblivious helper that does not possess the primary message, γ = 0. If the primary receiver cannot decode a common message, β = 0, the regions S 1,SD and S 2,SD coincide. They are depicted by the dashed red line. In other words, knowing the primary message is not beneficial, if no common message can be sent. This is because T 2 is too far away from R 1 for relaying to be beneficial.
Furthermore, Fig. 4 shows the optimal solution obtained by solving (13) and the SE points obtained by solving (38) for different cost values θ (blue dots). Note that for the case where power is cheap, i.e., θ is small, the rate of the secondary user R 2 tends to zero. This is due to the fact that even though the allowed power level P 2 for the secondary user is large, a larger fraction of jamming ρ is demanded by the primary user for the possibility to operate. Therefore, the secondary user becomes just a generous jammer that helps the primary system to reduce the leakage through link c 12 . On the other hand, for large values of cost θ, the secondary user's utility U 2 is dominated by the second term, i.e., −θP 2 . Hence, utility maximization at the first step of the Stackelberg procedure reduces to minimization of the secondary power P 2 . This yields P 2 → 0 and the set-up reduces to the wiretap channel. That is why the achievable rate R 1 for the primary user reduces to the wiretap rate R W T 1 for high costs θ. Thus, there exists an optimal value of the cost maximizing the secondary rate.
B. Performance Comparison
In this section we compare the results obtained from numerical solution of the optimization problems investigated in Section IV, i.e., problems P R2 , P R1 and P P2 (and their respective special cases), together with the Stackelberg equilibrium rate and power outcomes. We fix the positions of the primary terminals and the secondary receiver at the previous locations and vary the position of the secondary transmitter within a rectangle R, with R {x T2 ∈ [−1, 2] ∩ y T2 ∈ [−1, 2]}. Fig. 5 compares the achievable transmission rates R 2 of the secondary system, tolerable powers and necessary power splitting for different positions of the secondary transmitter. Each subfigure depicts the same spatial region, where the positions of the primary transmitter-user pair as well as the secondary user are marked by white circles. The colors show how the secondary rate and the different power fractions change as the secondary transmitter changes its position. Fig. 5 is constituted of three columns. The first column depicts the equilibrium outcomes of the Stackelberg game between T 1 and T 2 , where the cost is set to θ = 0.1. The second column represents the maximization P R2 (β) of R 2 subject to R 1 ≥ R WT 1 with β = 0. The third column corresponds to the general optimization problem P R2 . The first row of subplots depicts the achievable secondary rate R 2 in logarithmic scale. The remaining rows show the power fractions P 2s , P 2j , P 2p for P R2 (β) and P 2c for P R2 , while the last row shows the total required power P 2 . In the fourth row for P R2 , P 2p is not presented since it is observed that the relaying power is always zero, i.e., T 2 prefers using common message to relaying for P R2 .
1) Secondary Rate Maximization and Stackelberg Equilibrium:
First, we compare the achievable R 2 for the three optimization problems in the first row. As expected, we observe that the Stackelberg equilibrium leads to lower rates, since T 2 maximizes its utility after T 1 's maximization. Moreover, there is a cost for the power used in the Stackelberg model, whereas power conservation is not crucial in the other rate maximization problems. Higher rates are achieved for P R2 than for P R2 (β) since more strategies are available at T 2 .
We also note that for the maximization of R 2 , the peak of the achievable rate is located exactly at the position of the secondary receiver U 2 , which reflects the fact that for the pathloss channel model the closer the communicating terminals, the higher the transmission rate. Interestingly, in contrast to this result, for the Stackelberg equilibrium solution, the optimal location of the secondary transmitter that maximizes the utility U 2 is shifted further away from the primary system. To conclude the analysis of the game-theoretic solution, we note the low power consumption of T 2 in the SE (around 20% of the allowed transmission power) which justifies the lower R 2 . The Stackelberg strategy represents balancing between own message power P 2s , necessary to achieve a strictly positive utility, and jamming power P 2j needed in order not to deteriorate the primary transmission in terms of secrecy.
We now compare the second and third columns of Fig. 5 , corresponding to P R2 (β) and P R2 , respectively. First, we notice that for P R2 , all the available power is utilized for all locations of T 2 , while this is not the case for P R2 (β). This is due to the fact that when there is no common message, a power threshold exists above which T 2 cannot transmit without breaching the constraint R 1 ≥ R WT 1 , by either creating additional interference at the primary user from P 2s or P 2j or by leaking information to the secondary user from P 2p .
Comparing the figures in the first row, we notice that the achievable secondary rates R 2 are significantly higher for P R2 . Operating secondary rates and powers depending on the position of T 2 for P R 2 and the Stackelberg Game. Row 1 corresponds to the rate R 2 , and rows 2 to 5 to the power allocations of P 2s , P 2j , P 2c or P 2p , and P 2 , respectively.
Stackelberg Equilibrium
Furthermore, for some topologies the problem P R2 (β) does not yield a positive secondary rate R 2 , which means that the secondary system cannot operate. This is the case in the black regions. Thus, there exists a considerable performance improvement between the cases with and without common message. Opportunity to transmit a message that can be decoded by both users is game changing. It should be noted, though, that this demands advanced decoding capabilities, which might not be provided by the primary system. Finally, we discuss the power allocations for P R2 (β) and P R2 . For P R2 , most of the power is allocated to the common message as expected, while the power allocated for jamming and own message is concentrated in the locations close to U 2 . For P R2 (β), we observe that the power allocations depending on (x T2 , y T2 ) conforms to the intuition: a high proportion (up to 90%) of the power is used for relaying when T 2 is located close to U 1 . Moreover, P 2s is higher when T 2 is close to U 2 and on the opposite side from U 1 , so that interference is low at U 1 . Meanwhile, jamming is used in high proportions for locations of T 2 where it cannot hurt the primary transmission.
We conclude that the secondary system benefits strongly if U 1 can decode a common message. Transmitting a common message is the predominant strategy. If no common message can be used (β = 0), the system has to rely on relaying and jamming. This reduces the secondary rate or even prohibits the operation of the secondary system. The Stackelberg game results in much less total power consumption P 2 at the cost of reduced secondary rate. Note that this trade-off can be changed to some extent by adjusting the cost ϑ. However, we show results only for ϑ = 0.1 due to space constraints.
2) Primary Rate Maximization: Fig. 6 illustrates problem P R1 , namely maximization of the primary rate R 1 , and the corresponding secondary transmit power allocation. The threshold on the secondary rate R thr 2 is set to 80% of the maximum R 2 , which was attained in problem P R2 . Note that the threshold depends on the position of T 2 . In other words, we ask how much R 1 can be increased if the secondary system reduces its rate by 20%. The results in Fig. 6 are depicted for two problems, the first column is P R1 (β) and the second column is P R1 . Note that we use the last row for depicting P 2 and P 2c for P R1 (β) and P R1 , respectively. We have P 2c = 0 for P R1 (β), while P 2 = 10 everywhere for P R1 .
Interestingly, for P R1 , R 1 can be significantly increased if T 2 is close to U 1 . In this case relaying is beneficial and becomes the predominant strategy. The 80% of R 2 are attained by a fraction P 2c , so that the remaining power is used for relaying. In P R1 (β), however, almost all the power was already used for relaying. Reducing R 2 frees only marginal amounts of power, and hence R 1 cannot be increased significantly.
If T 2 is close to U 2 , the rate R 1 can only be increased marginally for both P R1 (β) and P R1 . Less power is required for transmitting both the secondary and the common messages. Therefore, R 1 can be increased by jamming slightly more than for the problem P R2 . Again, our results show the importance of the common message strategy. Not only is the secondary rate R 2 higher; the strategy also permits to significantly increase the primary rate R 1 , having R 2 reduced.
3) Secondary Power Minimization:
To evaluate the power minimization problem, we calculate the rate regions for successive increase of P 2 . We find the minimum P 2 such that the rate constraints are fulfilled. Like in previous simulations, R thr 2 is set at 80% of the maximum rate R 2 found by for the problems P R2 (β) and P R2 , respectively. The result is depicted in Fig. 7 , structured similarly as before, except that the total power P 2 is shown in the first row, while the other rows describe the power allocation strategies adopted by T 2 .
First, we compare the corresponding values of P 2 in the last row and second and third column of Fig. 5 . We see that the overall power consumption has been significantly reduced compared to the rate maximization problems. The effect is the most significant for P P2 since all available power P 2 was utilized for all locations of T 2 in the problem P R2 . Interestingly, the power saving opportunities are most prominent around the location of U 2 .
We now visualize that the power allocation strategies depending on (x T2 , y T2 ) are noticeably similar to the strategies adopted for the secondary rate maximizations depicted in Fig. 5 . In particular for P P2 (β), in a large region between U 1 and U 2 , T 2 does not transmit since no rate R 2 > 0 is achievable without hurting the primary system. When T 2 is close to U 2 on the opposite side of U 1 , most of P 2 is allocated to T 2 's own message; while when T 2 is closer to U 1 in the opposite side of U 2 , the power is mainly allocated to relaying. Finally, we make the interesting observation that when T 2 is close enough to U 2 and common message is available, even power P 2 close to zero suffices to satisfy the rate constraints. Operating primary rates and powers depending on the position of T 2 for P R 1 . Row 1 corresponds to the rate R 1 , and rows 2 to 5 to the power allocations of P 2s , P 2j , P 2p , and P 2c and P 2 , respectively.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the impact of the cooperation of the secondary user to enhance the secrecy of the primary message for the cognitive channel. Based on achievable rate regions for the two different cognitive scenarios, we first investigated three main optimization problems: the maximization of the secondary rate without decreasing the secrecy of the primary message, the maximization of the primary secrecy rate and the minimization of the secondary transmit power. We also found the solutions in closed-form for special cases of these optimizations. Operating powers depending on the position of T 2 for P P 2 . Here columns 1 and 2 correspond to the minimization of P 2 in the cases P P 2 (β) and P P 2 , respectively. Rows 1, 2, 3 and 4 correspond to the minimum power consumption of the secondary user, P 2s , P 2j , and P 2p or P 2c , respectively.
We then assumed a more realistic cooperative scenario where we modeled the interaction between both transmitters as a Stackelberg competition. We derived the Stackelberg equilibrium for this game and analyzed its impact numerically in comparison to the fully cooperative case. While the secondary rate attained at the SE is lower than the maximum possible rate, the consumption of secondary power is much less. We observed this from the rate region for a specific topology as well as from our simulations of a varying topology, where we changed the position of the secondary transmitter T 2 .
We also studied the secondary rate maximization P R2 for the varying topology. We showed that the transmission of a common message, which can be decoded by both receivers, is a powerful strategy. This is especially true if T 2 is close to the primary receiver U 1 , where interference needs to be minimized. We then reduced the rate R 2 by 20% and examined how this increases the primary rate R 1 or decreased the secondary power P 2 in P R1 and P P2 , respectively. While T 2 being located close to U 1 is optimal for maximizing R 1 , the opportunity for reducing the power P 2 is largest if T 2 is close to U 2 . This is due to the possibility of effective relaying in the first case, and of transmitting the secondary message, in the other case. As for the problem P R2 , transmitting a common message is beneficial for the problems P R1 and P P2 .
